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Is Economic Development a Subject?
Lloyd G. Reynolds
A striking feature of postwar economics has been the "development boom.

11

In 1945

anyone scanning library shelves for a book on economic development would have found only
Schumpeter.

There was probably not a single university course under this heading.

Today

there are dozens of such courses, several standard textbooks, scores of monographs,
hundreds of articles and government reports.

Economic development is among the two or

three most popular specialties for students of economics.
Yet it is not at all clear that economic development constitutes a distinct subject.
Specialists in older branches of our science view this intruder in the curriculum with con
siderable reserve.

There is good reason for this skepticism. Work on the less developed

countries has been heavily policy-oriented rather than scientifically oriented, more con
cerned with projecting the future than with understanding the present and the past,.

Nor is

there any body of theory about early economic growth, comparable to the analytical tools
available to the student of public finance or international trade.
It may be useful, therefore, to look at the work of the past twenty years in perspec
tive.

Is economic development a subject, actual or potential? If potential, what shape

can be discerned in the present embryo?
A brief comment is needed on terminology.

Geographically . development economists

are concerned with the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa (excepting South Africa
and Japan).

The least bad term for this group of countries is perhaps

countries or LDC's, which seems to have come into increasing use.
11

11

less developed
The remaining

nations--Austr alasia, South Africa, Japan, North America, Europe including the U.S.
should then be termed "more developed countries"(MDC 's).
ordering rather than a simple dichotomy.

s. R. -

This is, of course, a rank

Nations toward the top of the LDC list will

-2gradually move over into the MDC category (as, for example, Israel, Greece, Yugoslav ia,
Mexico).

Nor is the ranking simply, or even primarily , in terms of per capita output.

We

place Japan in the MDC group not because its per capita output is high, but because its
politico-e conomic organizat ion is "modern" and because its economic growth has been
sustained over a long period.
Students of long-term change in the MDC 1 s usually say they are analyzing economic
growth, while work on the LDC 1 s is usually labeled economic developm ent.
satisfacto ry distinctio n.
economic growth.

This is not a

Surely poor countries as well as rich countries may experienc e

It does not seem useful to say that the British economy was developin g

between 1750 and 1800, but growing between 1900 and 1950.

The term "developm ent 11 is

ambiguou s also because of ,its strong activist connotati ons.
It seems best, therefore , to use growth to cover scientific analysis and developm ent

to cover policies aimed at initiating or accelerat ing growth.
something one can measure, describe and try to explain.

Growth (or its absence) is

Developm ent, which involves

target-se tting and policy formation , is something one tries to achieve.

An understan ding of

how economic growth occurs is naturally useful in framing developm ent policies.

But con

fusion of the two activities can only work mischief.
The problem of this paper can now be posed more precisely : does economic analysis
of today's LDC 1 s, including (but not limited to) study of early economic growth in these
countries , constitut e a distinct kind of work within economic s?
We shall approach the problem from three direction s: first, do we now have plausible
hypothes es about early economic growth in the LDC's? Second, what lines of research are
presently underway or might usefully be undertake n, on these economie s?

Third, does this

work involve merely applicatio n of establish ed tools of "Western economic s, " or does it
involve a good deal of new tool-build ing? A finding that fresh theorizing is necessary

-3would strengthen the view that here is indeed a valid scientific specialty.
I. Old Dogmas and New Hypotheses
The roots of the "development boom" were not primarily intellectual.
ceded theory, as has typically been true in economics.

Problems pre

Between 1945 and 1960 a dozen

colonial areas in Asia and two dozen in Africa achieved independent status.

The United

Nations provided a forum in which these new nations, along with older nations of Asia and
Latin America, could voice their problems and needs.

The dramatic income gap between

richer and poorer nations, which has continued to widen over the past generation, pricked
many consciences in the richer countries.

Political rivalry among the industrial nations,

and particularly between the United States and the U.S. S. R., placed the poor countries in
a favorable position to bargain for economic assistance.
The spectacular economic recovery of Western Europe in the wake of Marshall Plan
aid encouraged a facile assumption that American capital could work equal miracles in other
parts of the world.

As loans and grants to Europe tapered off, loans and grants to the less

developed countries were phased into an expanding U.S. aid programme.

Almost by over

sight the United States found itself in the business of promoting economic growth throughout
the world, but with little knowledge of the economies which were supposedly to be trans
formed.

As the 'fifties wore on there was an increasing flow of loans and grants from

Britain, Western Europe, the U.S. S. R. and the East European countries, and from inter
national organizations.
More or less simultaneously , there developed during the nineteen fifties a set of
ideas which helped to rationalize these ongoing programs while also passing in some
academic circles as a theory of early economic growth.
orthodoxy may be set out as follows:

The cardinal points of the older
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There is a category of "underdeveloped countries, " sufficiently similar to warrant

a general diagnosis and prescription.
2.

The people of these countries, or key leadership groups in these countries, have

a strong interest in raising per capita output.
3.

The factor limiting the rate of economic growth is typically a shortage of capital.

4.

The relation between increments of capital and increments of output can be taken

as reasonably constant, which enables one to transform output targets into capital
requirements.
5.

Domestic saving is typically insufficient to finance a desirable growth rate.

6.

The gap between domestic savings and required capital formation can, however,

be filled by capital transfers from abroad.
7.

Given adequate aid at the outset, a country's need for aid will eventually

diminish and it will "take off" into self-sustained growth.
This set of ideas was optimistic, policy-oriented, preoccupied with capital require
ments, and fortified by casual empiricism.

It visualized a future in which one after

another of the poor nations will have "taken off," propelled by relatively short bursts of
aid from the richer countries. Whatever its policy uses, its scientific effect was
stultifying, for it announced that we already knew the answers when in fact serious
research had scarcely begun.
This view of the world appears most clearly in the writings of W.W. Rostow and Paul
Rosenstein-Rodan.

In a remarkable article published in 1961,

1

Professor Rosenstein-Rodan

projected the feasible growth rate of 81 LDC's (including such well-documented regions as
1 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," Review of
Economics and Statistics, May 1961, pp. 107-138.

-s'-'

Laos and Nepal!) from 1961 to 1976,

These growth rates were then converted into capital

requirements by using a standard 3: 1 incremental capital-output ratio.
saving in each country was then projected.

Future domestic

Estimates of future marginal savings rates were

based on 1961 information concerning average savings rates, 1 which was apparently
accepted as reliable.

Finally, domestic saving was deducted from capital requirements to

yield the "necessary capital inflow. 11
This kind of political arithmetic is doubtless necessary in government departments.
It is surprising only that it should have been presented as a serious piece of economic
research.
The Rostow

11

take-off" concept requires little comment, because it has already come

under heavy and justified criticism.
happened as Rostow surmised.

As regards the MDC's, things seem simply not to have

To be sure, careful reading of the original article 2 reveals

that he committed himself to little in the way of testable hypotheses.

On the few points

where he did venture quantitative generalizations--rates of capital formation, rates of
output increase--the evidence runs counter to his hypotheses.

Professor Kuznets' con

clusions on this matter carry weight:

111 1n the majority of cases the marginal savings rate was assumed as roughly twice as high
as the average rate" (p. 136). Since the article appeared in 1961, the 1961 base-year
"data" presented on national output, population,. savings and other variables cannot have
been actual measurements. As nearly as one can determine from footnotes, the 1961
figures were projections by the author from actual data for 1957, drawn mainly from the
U. N. National Accounts Yearbook, 1959.
2

W.W. Ros tow, "Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth, 11 Economic Journal. Subsequently,
the doctrine was enlarged and somewhat vulgarized in a small book (W. W. Rostow, The
Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Still later,
the issues were discussed thoroughly and quite critically at a conference organized by the
International Economic Association (see W~ w. Rostow (ed.). The Economics of the Take-Off,
New York: Martin's Press, 1963.
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"The capital formation rates, if they rise, climb at a sustained rate and for a much
longer period tha the two or three decades of take-off.

Rates of growth of total product, if

they show any long-term acceleration (and those for only a few countries do within the
period beginning with the take-off stage) increase slowly and certainly over a longer period
than the short span of the take-off. .. I can only conclude that the available evidence lends
no support to Professor Rostow's suggestions."

1

This view is reinforced by the detailed

analysis of early economic growth in Britain, France, and other countries presented at the
I.E. A. conference.
As regards the LDC's, Rostow asserted, on the basis of a few years' data from the
early 'fifties, that some of them were "attempting take-off.
little meaning.

11

Such a statement surely has

The experience of repeated take-offs and landings in some countries since

1950 suggests a helicopter rather than a jet aircraft simile.

Bicanic' notion that nations

creep painfully over the threshold of economic development is even more appropriate.

If the earlier orthodoxy has collapsed, what remains? What do we actually know
about early economic growth?

Surely very little.

We know little even about early growth

in the older industrial countries, on which economic historians have been working for
generations. We have little idea how far--if at all--conclusion s drawn from 18th and 19th
century growth are applicable to a quite different range of economies in the late twentieth
century.

We certainly do not have a long enough record for today's LDC's to determine

which of them have embarked on a sustained growth path and how this happened.
This is not to say that we are without ideas.

It will be useful to advance a few

hypotheses about early economic growth in today's LDC's--ideas which at some points run
directly counter to the traditional doctrine.

Let it be clear, however, that these are merely

hypotheses, which can be tested only by much additional research.
1 Simon Kuznets, "Notes on the take-off," in W.W. Rostow (ed.), op. cit.

-71.

Economic growth is not homogeneous.

heterogeneous.
all.

The countries which we label LDC' s are quite

No generalizations about economic structure and behavior apply equally to

If one looked carefully at the MDC' s in the era when their accelerated growth began,

their heterogeneity would doubtless appear equally great.
U.S. A. in 1830, Japan in 1870.

Consider England in 1750, the

Growth itself gradually smooths out many differences and

produces considerable resemblance among "mature" economies; but this is not true in the
incipient stages.

If countries enter on economic growth with differing internal structures and under
different external circumstances, it follows that what happens in the early stages of growth
will differ from one case to the next.

True, output per capita rises, capital formation rises

as a percentage of national product, and so on.
what we

~

by economic growth.

But this is purely definitional--this is

It does not indicate that the initial factor endowment

or the stimuli to growth, or the leading and lagging sectors, or the attendant institutional
transformation were similar from case to case.

One should not expect, then, to arrive at a

single theory of early economic growth.
2.

Economic growth is gradual.

It is not accomplished by a single "big push," nor is it

compressed into a Rostovian take-off period of two to three decades.
capita at first rises slowly, sometimes almost imperceptibly.

Rather, output per

The growth rate then gradu

ally increases, and so does the capital formation rate, though there is no indication of a
close relation between increments of capital and output.

This acceleration continues for

perhaps 50 to 75 years before the growth rate, the capital formation rate, and (possibly) the
rate of population increase settle down on a kind of plateau.

To a mediaeval historian 75

years may seem a short period; but it is much longer than the ..take-off" periods visualized
in much of the development literature.
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Reasons for the inevitability of gradualness are not hard to find.

In a new country it

may take decades to establish secure political leadership, orderly procedures for the transfer
of power, internal law and order, and other prerequisites for economic progress.

Gradual

ness is inherent also in the time required to lay down the physical infrastructure of a modern
economy, and in the subsequent lag before other productive activities have "grown up" to
the point of utilizing these facilities fully.
of human populations.

Perhaps equally important is the slow turnover

It is a truism that the most important product of economic moderniza

tion is a different kind of person, and that this different person is required for effective
operation of the new facilities.

If one starts today to educate all children aged 6, it will

be twenty years before these children have reached peak productive efficiency.
the occupational level, the longer the gestation period.

The higher

It may be thirty or forty years

before highly-educated business managers, political leaders, agriculturalists and civil
servants have taken over from their less well educated forbears.
It is often said that poor nations today are determined to develop more rapidly than
their predecessors, and optimistic projections are often embodied in "perspective plans.
But future projections are less persuasive than past accomplishments.

11

Where are the LDC's

which have succeeded in modernizing their economies and achieving a sustained growth rate
of, say, 2 percent per capita per year in less time than was required by the richer nations?
One can point to Israel and Taiwan, but these are ·special cases.

Both countries imported

large quantities of human capital--administrators, business men, technicians, teachers-
in the first case from Europe, and in the second from mainland China.

Both countries

received foreign funds which, relative to their small populations, were very large.
not to grow, they would have had to be remarkably wasteful and inept.

In order

The growth of these

two countries resembles the postwar reconstruction of Japan and Western Europe which,
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given a rich endowment of human capital plus substantial imports of physical capital, were
able to restore their productive capacity in a remarkably short time.
3.

Economic growth depends mainly on internal effort.

The classic cases of almost com-

pletely self-financ ed developmen t are Britain, Japan, and more recently the U.S. S. R.

Some

of the European countries, such as Sweden, received limited amounts of capital from abroad.
The most substantial nineteenth- century capital movements, however, were to the frontiers
of settlement in the United States and the British Dominions.

This was part of a vast trans

fer of human beings as well as capital goods, combined with continuous settlement of new
land and exploitation of additional natural resources.

Had the foreign capital component

been missing, expansion might have been slower, but it is very unlikely that it would have
been stopped.

The willingness of British bankers to market American railroad bonds can

scarcely be considered the key to the dramatic expansion of the American economy.
It would be useful to compare contempora ry growth rates in the LDC's (which are
1
themselves difficult to determine ) and to correlate these with various measures of foreign
capital inflow.

Even if such an exercise yielded a positive relation, one could not infer

that the foreign capital was the source of more rapid growth.

It is more likely that countries

with a superior institutiona l framework and internal leadership, which are able on this
account to grow faster than others, are considered superior credit risks and are able to
attract larger amounts of foreign funds.

Capital typically flows toward those who need it

least.
1 Estimates of gross national product by urban economists and statistician s are not
reliable in a primarily agricultural economy where production data are poor and most
of the product is non-market ed. It may even be that the concept of GNP, which was
11
Greater
developed under modern American conditions, is a "rich country gadget.
and in
products,
major
for
series
importance ·should be attached to physical output
the absence of these no firm conclusion s can be drawn.
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Economic growth involved a diversified increase in output across a broad front.

Some

lines of production naturally grow faster than others, and there may even be a sensational
spurt in one field (British cotton goods, 1780-1820, or Swedish timber output, 1830-1880).
But these are not "leading sectors" in the sense of an engine pulling an inert mass.
growth in one sector both requires and encourages growth in related activities.

Rapid

Unless

conditions in the economy are broadly favorable to growth, as they were in the British and
Swedish cases, expansion in a single sector will prove abortive.
enclave economy is no exception.

The colonial type of

While a substantial rate of expansion may be achieved

within the enclave, this typically fails to communicate itself to the mass of the population
and to activate a general growth process.
It is now generally recognized that increases in agricultural output are an indispens
able feature of early economic growth.

The industrialization of the MDC's was typically

accompanied or preceded by substantial agricultural progress.

In today's LDC's, too, the

behavior of agriculture is the best single test of growth capacity.

The reason is not just

that higher agricultural output is essential in an expanding economy. but also that inability
to activate agriculture is symptomatic of weaknesses in government leadership and administration.

Anyone can order a steel mill, but the intransigent problems of agriculture are a

crucial test of innovational ability.
5.

Output expansion is accomplished initially by absorbing previously unused resources.

In the conventional view economic growth is being held back by resource scarcities, and
particularly by a shortage of capital.

It is more accurate to say that, in a stagnant

economy, the resources needed for a higher level of output are present but under-utilized
There is often cultivable land which is not already under cultivation.

Many workers may

be unemployed or underemployed, and can be induced to work longer hours in industry or

1

!

-11agriculture.

Management and entrepreneurship may also be present but under-utilized.

Nothing is more striking in the early growth history of the advanced countries than the ease
with which merchants moved over into manufacturing, banking and other new activities as
opportunities for profit appeared.

They ended up working harder, making larger profits.

contributing more to production.
There are also indications that many LDC' s have unused saving capacity.
that investment is being held back by unwillingness to save.

Rather, people who could

save perceive only limited investment opportunities attended by high risk.

If the outlook

changes and the prospective yield of capital rises, saving will be undertaken.
also unused saving potential in the fiscal mechanism.

It is not

There is

Lewis has argued that no country is

too poor to devote, say, 20 percent of national output to public sector purposes.

If actual

revenues are small, and if the proportion of revenue devoted to investment is also small,
the main reason may be weak government and poor public administration.
The view that capital shortage is not a major barrier to early economic growth is
supported also by the experience of the MDC's.

Close students of early industrialization

in Britain and Western Europe are of the opinion that finance was not a serious limitation on
industrial development.

Habbakuk, for example, states that perceived investment

opportunities typically generated the necessary capital, rather than vice versa. 1 Deane
and Cole ~ress the opinion, with respect to early eighteenth-century England, that "the
limiting factors to an increase in capital formation seem to have operated more from the
side of investment than from the side of saving. " 2
1 See in particular his essay on II The historical experience on the basic conditions of
economic progress," in L. Dupriez (ed.), Economic Progress (Louvain: Institut de Re
icherches Economiques et Sociales, 1955)
2

Dupriez (ed.), op. cit., p. 260
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If there is any basic scarcity in the LDC 1 s it is a scarcity of leadership, of ability to
innovate in both the private and public sectors.

This limitation has been heavily, and in

our view correctly, emphasized by Hagen and Hirschman.
6.

Economic growth involves a transformat ion of politico-eco nomic institutions .

relevant economic institutions are those which affect factor and product markets.

'!;he
In labor

markets this includes adequate training facilities, encouragem ent of desirable mobility,
and modernized wage-settin g practices.

In capital markets it includes private and public

banks, insurance companies and other savings institutions .

In industry and commerce it

means a gradual superseding of the small family business by large enterprise and prof.es
sional managemen t.
ability of

11

In agriculture it means marketing facilities, sources of credit, avail

modern 11 inputs, and technical assistance.

It is unnecessar y for a country to have a full panoply of such institutions before

growth can begin.

It need not have a stock exchange, or a social security system, or much

corporate enterprise.

To a large extent developmen t of

by-product of economic growth.
so in the LDC I s.

II

modern II economic institutions is a

It was so in the older industrial countries, and it will be

At the same time, some minimum institutiona l base must exist quite early.

The make-up of this minimum base is surely one of the key problems in growth economics.
The government al structure must also be broadly favorable before economic growth can
begin.

But again, we do not know what this means in concrete terms,

skirted the issue and political scientists have not met it head-on.

Economists have

Moreover, orientation of

government toward economic objectives, and improvemen t of its technical efficiency to
attain those objectives, seems to be in good measure an accompanim ent of long-sustai ned
growth.

Once economic modernizati on is underway, the political milieu becomes modified

in a way progressive ly more favorable to continued growth.

This "virtuous circle II can be

traced in societies as diverse as those of Britain, the U.S. S. R. and Japan.

!
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Discussion of the role of government in today's LDC's is afflicted by opposing dogmas.
On one side is the nee-liberal view that, if government will stand out of the way, private
initiative will mobilize increased resources and direct them toward the most productive uses.
On the other side is the planning technician's view that government can generate growth
through administrative actions, and can predict and regulate its pace.

In most LDC' s,

however, 80 to 90 percent of national output comes from the private sector.

Here government

cannot compel exxpansion, but must induce it by creating a structure of incentives which
will lead producers to respond in the desired way.
It would be helpful if speculative and ideological discussion of these matters were
replaced by careful analysis of experience.

VI/hat did governments in the MDC's contribute

to early acceleration of growth in those countries? What have governments in selected
LDC' s been doing over the past generation, and with what consequences?

What kinds of

action seem to have contributed to growth, and what policies have led to stagnation?
can in the end be no substitute for such

Q

There

detailed, case-by-case analysis of the historical

record.
II. The Positive Study of Less Developed Economies
We turn now to our second main theme. What kinds of economic research can usefully
be undertaken in the LDC' s? What is the potential content of the subject, viewed as a
branch of positive economics?

Is this content substantial enough to warrant considering

this a separate specialtyr?
The present state of the literature suggests that, if there is a subject here, it remains
to be defined.

Textbooks, research monographs, and course outlines represent a wide

variety of concepts and approaches.

Some universities, indeed, have several "development"

courses and seminars, with little in common except the name.
stage of pre-scientific groping and experimentation.

This clearly represents a

- l-4-

A striking feature of the literature is its heavily normative character.

Many courses

and texts embody a "how-to-do-it" approach to the subject: arguments over balanced
versus unbalanced growth, optimal savings rates, criteria for allocation of investment
funds, choice of technology, sources of external finance, planning methodology.
Practical problems have always been important in stimulating new developments in
economic thought.

But between initial problems and useful policy conclusions there has

usually intervened a gradual and arduous development of positive economics; definition and
measurement of important variables, analytical models intended to replicate important
aspects of behavior, framing and testing of specific hypotheses, gradual emergence of a
picture of the economy in operation.

The puzzling thing about much early work on the

LDC' s is the implicit assumption that this intervening stage can be by-passed, that one
can create a body of policy prescriptions "hanging in the air, " unsupported by a structure
of positive knowledge.

It is rather as though there had been, in the United States in the

1840's, an outburst of courses and textbooks on "how to improve the American economy and
make it grow faster. "

If one wants to engage in something other than current policy-making, what is there
to do? What lines of research into the less developed economies may yield improved
understanding of their operation, and lay a firmer basis for policy-making in the future?
Three main lines of work, complementary rather than competitive, suggest themselves:
micro-analysis of economic behavior in the LDC' s; study of total economies and their
evolution over time; and building alternative models of early economic growth.
Micro-analysis of Economic Behavior
In the developed countries since the nineteen-thirties macro-economics has held the
center of the stage and micro theory has been pushed into the background.

The tacit
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assumption is that the price mechanism works sufficiently well to warrant relative neglect
of resource supplies and resource use.
In the LDC 1 s this view is clearly not warranted.

The market network is fragmentary,

economic management (private and public) is sub-optimal, and innovation is laggard.

This

being so, detailed examination of the economy--sector by sector, market by market-
becomes a matter of urgency.

Little has yet been done in this direction.

Scattered studies

of this problem or that have lifted the corners of the veil covering a particular economy.
But is there a single case in which we can see all round the economy in the way thqt is
possible for Britain, France, Sweden, or Japan'?

I think not.

Agriculture, for example, is the largest industry in almost every LDC.
of the peasant household is central to an understanding of the economy.
models appear in the literature:

the "inert peasant,

11

The operation

Several competing

who cultivates traditional crops in a

traditional way, and is both ignorant of and unresponsive to possibilities of technical
change; the "lazy peasant, " a satisficer who will work only to the extent necessary to
achieve conventional standards of consumption; the "maximizing peasant," who knows the
possibilities of product and factor substitution, makes correct marginal calculations, and
is willing to invest to raise future output.

But we do not know which of these models is

most plausible, nor can we find out without more empirical study.
The system of land ownership, and the division of output between owner and
cultivator, may have important effects on labor input, choice of products and techniques,
and receptiveness to technical change.
warmly debated in many countries.
sequences of one system or another.

Proposals for changes in the tenure system are

In most cases little is known about the economic con
Yet quantitative analysis is often possible.

One

occasionally finds almost a laboratory situation, where the same crops are grown in the
same area, under two or more tenure systems.

In such cases input-output relations can
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be examined, and one can ask whether land tenure per se has effects which can be
segregated from those of other variables.
There is a large literature, mostly of a speculative character, on the possible
existence of II surplus labor,
agricultural sector.
positive product.

11

"redundant labor," or "disguised unemployment" in the

It is doubtful that further verbal battles on this front can yield any

But there is a shortage of studies in which precisely-framed hypotheses

have been confronted with relevant data.

Much of the verbal argument, indeed, relates to a

situation which is rare in reality, that of a declining farm labor force.

The common situa

tion in the LDC's, however, is that high population growth is swelling the farm labor force.
The interesting problem for study is how this growing labor force is absorbed (or not
absorbed) into the rural economy, and what happens in the process to labor inputs per acre
and to production methods.
There is a growing body of evidence that, where alternative crops are feasible,
peasant producers are responsibe to changes in relative prices.
duction rather than an expansion of production.

But this is a shift of pro

Much less is known about how aggregate

output responds to increased income possibilities.

To put the point differently: what

proportion of a potential increase in output must be left with the cultivator to persuade him
to produce the output?

Some material incentive is required, but there is little evidence on

how much.
Vve have not chosen agriculture for illustration because it has been especially under
investigated.

On the contrary, there has probably been more careful research on agriculture

in the LDC' s than on any other sector.
complexity of the industry.

Knowledge is slight only in relation to the size and

One could take any other branch of the economy--the public

sector, factory industry, foreign trade--and find a large array of significant unanswered
questions.
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The micro-economic problems requiring investigation cut right across the economy.
One interesting implication is that to proclaim oneself simply a "development economist" is
not very different from calling oneself a general practitioner.

Interest in the LDC's is in no

way incompatible with adequate specialization in one or more functional areas of economics.
One can aim at becoming a development economist_§__nd a public finance man, or an agricul
tural economist., or a student of international trade.
IntP.r-sectoral reJa.tions and econo_mic change
Along with study of sectoral problems, there is need for some economists to view
no.tional economies in the round.

How does the economy of Chile operate?

How do different

industries and sectors interact? What structural changes and lines of expansion are
observable over time?
This is not conventional macro-economics, using only a few highly aggregated vari
ables.

A LDC is usually a quite fragmented economy, with relatively low inter-sectoral

linJ:ages, clispante sectoral gre,wth rates, and acute problems of internal balance. Aggregate
measu::-es of national output, employment, investment, and so on are unrevealing unless
accompanied by sectoral measures.

These are also quite open economies in which fluctua

tions are induced more by external shocks than by changes in domestic investment.

To

c.nalyze how external influences ramify through the economy requires detailed knowledge of
its structure.
This kind of work requires dependable.sectoral measures of output, factor inputs,
productivity and prices.
labor and finance.

It involves analysis of inter-sectoral movements of commodities,

Input-output tables, national income and product statements, government

budgets, balance of payments accounts, and other standard measurement devices are
applicable.

These can be fitted together into an internally consistent set of national

economic accounts, revealing the anatomy of the economy in considerable detail.

-18This kind of analysis becomes increasingly interesting as it is extended over time.
A few years' experience tells very little.

At least twenty or thirty years is required to drnw

significant conclusions about growth rates and structural changes in an economy.
this may not suffice.

And even

Anyone observing Argentina over the years 1870-1914 must certainly

have concluded that this economy had "taken off." From the high growth rates of 1870-1914,
and the respectable growth rates of 1914-1929, it would have been quite impossible to
predict the much slower growth in the years 1930-1960.
In economies where one observes a sustained rise in per capita output over several
decades interesting questions arise.

Which kinds of output are increasing most rapidly?

How far is the output increase attributable to increased factor use, how far to "the
residual"?

Does the impetus seem to be mainly internal or external? How are increased

resources being mobilized and applied? Are sectoral bottlenecks or external constraints
holding the growth rate below what it might otherwise be?
This analysis of early economic growth necessarily involves notions about how
growth occurs.

While these are not yet very systematic, we do have some concepts and

hypotheses which can help to order the historical record.

The accumulation of longer

records of experience for more countries will in turn contribute to improvement of "growth
models." This interaction of theorizing and analytical description should be unusEally
vigorous over the next generation, as is true in any rapidly-develop ing area of study.·
Analysis of total economies may contribute also to a useful classification of LDC' s.
Everyone recognizes that the universe of LDC's is heterogeneous.

It is accepted that

different empirical generalizations and analytical models are required for different types
of economy.

But no one can yet say what is meant by "type" in this connection.

It is clear that per capita income is not a very useful basis of classification.

Zambia

and Venezuela stand quite high on the per capita income list; but few would argue that

-!9Zambi a is more develo ped than Japan .
well with growt h rate.

Nor does curren t level of per capita incom e correl ate

Argen tina and Chile are relativ ely high-i ncome count ries, but their

progre ss in recent decad es has been slow.
bilitie s.
A more intere sting basis of classi ficati on is relativ e factor availa
conce pt of

II

II
labor surplu s econo mies repres ents this appro ach.

which still have open frontie rs might be termed

II

The

The numer ous count ries

land surplu s econo mies." Venez uela, Iran,

plus econo mies" in the
and a few other oil rich countr ies might be consid ered "capit al-sur
bility .
sense that growth is not constr ained by foreig n excha nge availa
But this is a rather static kind of classi ficatio n.
factor s is compa tible with either growt h or stagna tion.
suppli es is also signif icant.

.Exces s supply of one or more
The rate of chang e in exces s

Is an initia l surplu s of labor shrink ing over time, or is it

emplo yment expan sion?
rising throug h a high rate of popul ation growth plus a low rate of
on the impor tance
Seers has sugge sted 1 an outpu t-mix classi ficati on, based partly
on of output within each of
of indust ry relativ e to primar y produ ction, partly on divers ificati
these catego ries.

rial
His spectr um of econo mies runs from large and divers ified indust

one-m ineral econo mies
econo mies such as the U.S.A . or U.S. S. R., at one pole,t o the
repres ented at the extrem e by the "oil sheikh dom.
v,rith size and openn ess of the econo my.
increa singly the lever of the econo my.
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This classi ficati on correl ates rather well

As one goes down the spectr um, expor ts becom e
For one-c rop or one-m ineral econo mies detail ed

analy sis of the mafor export indust ry is crucia l.

develo

in terms of the
Still anothe r approa ch, empha sized partic ularly by Myint , runs
2
The proce ss typica lly starts
pment of money transa ctions and a marke t mecha nism.

1 Dudle y Seers, "An approa ch to the short- period analy sis of instab ility in prima1 y-prod ucing
count ries, 11 OE?, Feb. 1959.
2
ries
See·· in p\'.l.rt,:tcular Hla Myint ,· The-Econom:i:cs· of.' Devel oping Count
(I~ortd"c'in:,.:•.. :.r; ·.:~L. ~J-Iu'.tchinson,, 19 64) ..

-20with sale of one or more export products for cash; but if this is all that happens, the economy
Only in so far as cash dealings, specializati on in production, and

remains underdevelo ped.

trading relations spread gradually within the country can it be regarded as developing.

Its

degree of developmen t is measured by how far it has moved toward full specializati on, sale
of products and factor services for cash, and economic integration through markets.

Myint's

work is rich in suggestions about how and why an economy may move, or fail to move, in
this direction.
Suggestions for a typology of LDC's are thus not lacking.
agreed scheme.

But there is not yet any

Progress in this direction requires further country-by- country analysis of

particular economies.
Theories of ~arly Economic Growth
During the past twenty years there has been a spate of neo-Keynes ian and neoclassical growth models.

A recent survey article lists upwards of a hundred contribution s.

But most of this work is not relevant for present purposes.

1

The standard assumption s of

growth theory--one or at most two products, full mobility of factors, competitive pricing,
constant returns to scale, constant elasticity of labor-capit al substitution along well
behaved production functions-- are quite unrealistic even for the MDC' s.
they verge on fantasy.

For the LDC I s

Particularly restrictive is the common assumption of a single output

and a single production function.

The essence of underdevelo pment is a sharp cleavage

betv.reen "modern" and "traditional " production.

Nor can one get round this by applying

the standard growth theory only to the modern sector, leaving the much larger traditional
sector in residual status.

The behavior of the traditional sector as factor supplier and

product demander, including its gradual transformat ion and annexation to the modern sector,
is an integral part of early economic growth.
1 F. H. Hahn and R. C. 0. Matthews, "The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey,
Economic Journal, December 1964, pp. 779-902.
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-21Related to this is the neglect of land and the primacy of capital in modem growth
theory, which stamps it as industrially-oriented.

A theory of early economic growth must

explain what is happening in agriculture, which remains the largest sector of the economy
for many decades after growth begins.

The initial land-labor ratio, the organization of farm

I
production, the nature of production functions and of producers responses, the rate and

factor bias of technical change, are key features of any usable growth model.
It is not even clear at this stage what one should mean by a theory of early economic
growth.

There are several possible views.

First, theory might aim at explaining how

economic growth gets started in a previously stagnant economy.

What are the minimum

institutional pre-requisites? Given a favorable environment, what kinds of stimuli may set
the mechanism of expansion in motion?
case?

Is export-led growth a frequent or even the usual

Study of the preconditions of growth involves non-economic variables, some of which

1
are difficult to quantify; and so economists tend to hold back from it.

But there is little

indication that political scientists, social anthropologists, or others are going to produce
adequate theories of how economic growth begins.

Economists, who in recent decades have

tended to define the boundaries of their discipline more and more narrowly, should be
venturesome enough to conduct some forays into this difficult area.
Second, there is theorizing of a "biological" character.

This emphasizes the alter-

native ways in which the money economy may penetrate a system of household production,
and the changes in personal behavior, economic organization, and exchange relations which
occur in the process.

Institutional transformation is in the center of the stage, input-

output relations rather in the background.

The ingenious work of Myint in this area has

already been mentioned.
1 A notable exception is Professor Everett Hagen. See his two volumes, On the Theory of
Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962);
and The Economics of Development (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968).

-22-

Third, there are theories in which quantitative production relations play a central
role.

These theories are mechanical in the sense that, given one or more sectoral production

functions, and given the rates of input increase, certain rates of output increase follow
automatical ly.

Economic growth has already begun "before the curtain rises," and the

problem is to determine its rate and direction.

This kind of work, exemplified by the Lewis

and Fei-Ranis models, is attractive because of its quantitative character and the potentiality
of statistical testing.
Growth models adapted to the LDC' s, however, are still in an early stage of develop
ment.

Theoretical work has been focused on one kind of economy--t he fully settled, heavily

populated, "surplus labor" economy.

The assumption s used are highly simplified, and the

consequenc es of varying them in one direction or another need to be explored.

There has

been little analysis of other economic situations- -for example, the country with an open
frontier, or the economy with both unused land and unused labor time.
Most serious, virtually all models to date have been closed-econ omy models.
and capital movements, however, are central facts of life in most of the LDC' s.

Trade

Analysis of

the interrelatio ns of growth and trade--on which a good deal of work has already been done
by Johnson, Kindleberge r, Myint, Meier and others--pro mises rich returns.
ence of a long tradition of trade theory is in one sense an advantage.

Here the exist

On the other hand, the

extremely simplified assumption s of most trade theory, leading to limited ability to predict
actual trade flows, is a considerabl e weakness.

Work in this area can perhaps contribute as

much to improvemen t of trade theory as to building better models of economic growth.
To sum up:

one can conceive of a course on the LDC's which would be basically a

course in positive economics.

It would focus on the three kinds of work just described:

abstract models of how economic growth begins and proceeds during its early decades;
analysis of the structure and developmen t of selected LDC' s, viewed as total systems; and
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examination of the micro-economics of agriculture, industry, public finance, external trade,
and so on in this range of economies.

Much of the material covered would be relevant to

economic policy; but the course would not be organized around policy issues or normative
concepts.
The list of useful reading for such a course is still short.

But in view of the growing

volume of work on the LDC I s, the literature should be richer a decade from now.

Meanwhile

it is important to set out the right boxes, even if some of them remain almost empty for the

time being.
IIL

The Relevance of "Western Economics"

Economists and students from the LDC' s often assert, with varying degrees of strength,
that the economic theory taught in British and American graduate schools is not very relevant
to their own economies.
react strongly against it.

Some Western economists fall in with this assertion, while others
The issue is clearly important to our present concern.

If a

Western-traim.:d economist can employ, his usual tool-kit as effectively in Thailand as in
Gern-:any, if he in fact finds no need for additional tools, the case that study of the LDC's
constitutes a distinct specialty becomes less convincing.
It is often not clear what critics of Western economics really mean.
meaning may be eliminated at the outset.

One possible

Use of Vl/estern economic analysis is sometimes

identified with a particular policy stance, with idealization of the market mechanism and a
suspicion of government activity.

This is simply confusion.

There is no reason why such

concepts as utility, preference, production possibilities, or opportunity cost should be
identified with any one institutional setting.

Since the work of Lange and Lerner in the

'thirties it has been accepted that the apparatus of micro-economics can be redirected
toward management of a socialist system.

-24-

Setting aside this misunder standing, a statemen t about the limited relevance of
Western economic s may mean at least four different things:

(1) it may .nean that

guan_titat ive relations among economic variables are different and will need to be reestimate rl
in the LDC's; (2) it may mean that personal behavior is "less economic " in the LDC's, so
that one cannot assume the usual response s to material incentive s; (3) it may mean that the
priority of problems is different in the LDC's, with a conseque nt differenc e in the relative
importanc e of analytica l tools; (4) it may mean that, because of structura l differenc es in the
economy and society, one has to develop new tools for explanato ry and policy purposes .
The first statemen t is self-evid ently true.

For the Western economie s, we know a

good deal about price and income elasticiti es of demand, input-out put relations , returns to
labor and capital, consumpt ion and investme nt functions , and so on.

This knowledg e is not

directly transferab le to an economy operating at a much lower income level, with different
factor supplies, technolog y, and organizat ion.

Functiona l relations must be estimated

anew by painstaki ng research, as is still being done in the MDC's.

Because of the frag

mentation of the less developed economie s, there should be greater attention to particula r
sectors and industrie s, and greater skepticis m about the stability of aggregati ve coeffici
ents, than is needed in a more integrate d economy.
These differenc es in coefficie nts, however, are not damaging to the logical structure
of economic s.

The second kind of statemen t, which alleges non-econ omic behavior, would

be decidedly damaging .

But how convincin g are such allegatio ns?

Tests of economic rationalit y must be framed with care.
that individua ls' preferenc e systems are different in the LDC's.

It is not sufficien t to show

New factory workers in

Kenya may give less weight than American workers to security of job tenure relative to
money income.

Medium-i ncome families in Brazil may save a smaller proportio n of income

1
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than medium-income families in France or Canada.

Manufacturers in Pakistan may show

greater risk aversion and shorter time-horizons than their counterparts in developed
countries.

Such differences are readily accommodated within the framework of economic

analysis.
Nor is the relevant question whether peasant producers, for example, behave as the
outside observer concludes that they "ought" to behave.

The peasant's subjective situation,

the alternatives which appear open to him, and the considerations relevant to choice may be
quite different from the situation as viewed by the educated, middle-class, and perhaps
foreign .observer.

Given the subjective situation, the question is, first, whether material

welfare is prominent among the decision criteria, and second, whether the direction of
reactions is "normal,

11

i.e. whether higher levels of material satisfaction are preferred over

lower levels.
There is much evidence supporting an affirmative answer.

As regards peasant pro

ducers, several research workers have concluded that, given the techniques which they
know, peasants apply labor and capital to land as far as it is reasonable to do so, i.e.
until marginal rates of return have- fallen to a low level.

Moreover, where peasants produce

for market and where two or more crops are open to them, there is evidence of marked
responsiveness to changes in relative product prices.

If one crop becomes more advantage

ous than before, the proportion of acreage devoted to this crop rises with only a short
time-lag.
As regards labor, there is little doubt that workers prefer higher-wage jobs to lower
wage ones.

But it is sometimes asserted that a limited view of consumption possibilities

sets a low ceiling to income aspirations.

Once the ceiling is reached, the amount of labor

offered varies inversely with the hourly wage--the labor supply curve bends backward.
writer was at some pains to test this hypothesis as regards new factory workers in

The
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Puerto Rico, a group which is untypical only as regards the strong demonstration effect of
readily available American consumer goods.

For this group there was convincing evidence

that income aspirations were quite elastic. Workers wanted more money, knew what they
would do with it, and were willing to work longer hours to obtain it wherever factory
schedules permitted. 1

Elliot Berg has reported similar findings from studies of African

workers. 2
There are pro]Jably two reasons for the wide currency of the backward-bending supply
curve notion.

First, it has long been a standard argument offered by employers, particularly

foreign employers of indigenous labor, in defense of a low-wage policy.
at all new.

Nor is this defense

Two centuries ago early English industrialists argued that higher wages would

lead only to greater idleness, a conclusion which was challenged by Adam Smith, 3

Second, '

the argument is associated with the peculiar circumstances of migratory labor in certain
parts of Africa.

Here the family does not accompany the worker to his place of wage employ-

ment, the wife does not become a consumer, and the normal pressures for a higher scale of
household expenditure are inoperative.

It is not surprising, then, that men work only long

enough to acquire a few readily transportable consumer goods--bicycles, radios, etc. --or
to accumulate the customary bride price in their area,

On a world view, however, this

system of employment is quite untypical.
The third line of attack noted above--that the priority ranking of policy issues differs
as between MDC's and LDC 1 s--is on firmer ground.

The following areas, for example, seem

1
see Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in
Puerto Rico (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1965),
2Elliot I. Berg, "Backward-sloping labor supply functions:
Journal of Economics, August 1961, pp. 468-492.

The African case," Quarterly

3 "A plentiful subsistence ... it has been concluded, relaxes, and a scant one quickens
their industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle cannot
be doubted; but that it should have this effect on the greater partt;-tseems not very probable. 11
(Wealth of Nations, Everyman Edition, Volume I, p, 74),
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tivity: demography and population growth; the economics of small scale industry; the micro
aspects of taxation and public expenditure ; and internationa l trade and capital movements.
To the extent that economics is viewed as a policy instrument, then, there is a
correspondi ng re-ranking of the usefulness of analytical tools.

The basic tools of micro

economics are highly useful in the LDC I s, whether applied to agricultural production. the
economics of industry, the impact of taxation, or cost-benefi t analysis of public sector
projects. w·estern macro-econ omics is considerabl y less useful.

Paradoxical ly, modern

growth theory has little to offer to economies in which growth is the most urgent practical
problem.

Post-Keyne sian theories of income determinati on and economic fluctuations are

also not readily transferable to the LDC 1 s.

Thus the tendency in many Western graduate

schools to emphasize a kind of macro-econ omics adapted to MDC institutions . while
relegating micro-econ omics to a secondary place, is precisely the wrong thing for students
from the less developed countries.
This still does not answer the fourth question posed above, which is perhaps the most
fundamenta l.

Does analysis of the less developed economies require simply a reshuffling

of the same instruments , a lifting of different tools from what remains essentially the same
tool-kit? Or does it require also a significant amount of new tool constructio n?

Is there a

new species of "LDC economics" in process of developmen t, or at least capable of being
developed?
These are complex and difficult questions and the answers depend on the level of
abstraction under considerati on.

Such concepts as individual preference systems or produc

tion functions are so fundamenta l that any kind of economic reasoning must take them as a
point of departure.
space.

At this level one can argue that economics is independen t of time and

But economics does not consist solely of such basic ideas.

There is a hierarchy of
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theoretical constructs, ranging from the simple and general to the quite complex and
specific--from, say. the concept of profit maximization to a model of investment decisions
in the steel industry in contemporary United States.

As theory comes closer to grappling with ,

a specific body of phenomena, its structure becomes more elaborate, specific, and
empirically oriented.
At some stage of elaboration and specialization the kind of theory required to explain
a certain range of economic phenomena in a LDC--the variables to be included, the presumed
relations among them, the specific hypotheses to be tested--begins to differ significantly
from that which is relevant to the MDC' s.
in a MDC may be useful as background.

Experience in having worked on similar problems
But it is only background? and does not obviate the

need for new theoretical constructs and new research design.
This can be illustrated from a variety of fields.

We have already noted that the kind

of growth theory relevant to the LDC's is considerably different from that currently being
developed for the advanced industrial countries.
economics.

This is true also of short-run macro

The fact that fluctuations are externally induced rather than investment

induced, and that they impinge on economies with a small public sector, a primitive
monetary system, and serious supply inelasticities changes both the analysis of fluctuations
and the nature of stabilization measures.
While Latin American theories of "structural inflation" may be partly an apologia for
fiscal laxity, they are not wholly that.

Monetary processes and price behavior do differ

from the corresponding processes in the MDC's, and require fresh lines of analysis.
There has been a strong reaction against standard international trade theory in the
LDC's, most marked again in Latin America.

While some of the counter-reason ing advanced

from the LDC' s may appear implausible, the deficiencies of trade theory are undoubtedly real.
Work has focused on comparative advantage and optimal trade patterns at a point in time,
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with given factor supplies and identical production functions in each trading nation.

But

the assumption of identical production functions between MDC's and LDC's is unacceptable
•:o definition.
issue.

How to import technology, and what technology to import is a major policy

The problem of the LDC' s, as Chenery 1 and others have shown, is to define

dynamic comparative advantage under conditions in which tastes, relative factor supplies
and prices, and technology are all subject to rapid change.

Analysis of the dynamics of

trade relations, which in the MDC's may appear merely interesting, is for the LDC's a
vital necessity.

There is need for fresh theoretical and empirical work, conventional in

the sense of being linked to a long tradition of past work, but original in placing structural
change over time in the center of the picture.

In agriculture, theorizing about the production-consumptio n behavior of peasant
households

2

is significantly different from the production economics of a midwestern

American farm.

In industry, models of the isolated profit-maximizing firm or of the inter

action of firms in a competitive industry are useful but by no means sufficient.

There are

problems of distinguishing private from social profitability. of estimating returns to a
complex of interrelated investments ten or twenty years in the future, of devising efficient
sequences of investment

a la

Hirschman.

These kinds of analysis are similar in being

time-related, forward-looking, and extending beyond the bounds of a single industry.
rest in a sense on standard micro concepts.

They

But these concepts must be manipulated in new

ways to explore, not optimal resource allocation at a moment, but optimality over extended
periods of time.
Thus an industrial economist, or agricultural economist, or international economist
will find himself becoming a different kind of economist as he works on the structure of the
1 Hollis

B. Chenery, "Comparative advantage and development policy," American Economic
Review, March 1961, pp. 18-51.
2 see, for example, A. K. Sen, "Peasants and dualism, with or without surplus labor, "
Journal of Political Economy. October 1966, pp. 425-450.
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LDC's.

He will have a certain expertise not possessed by those who have not strayed

outside the developed world.

He will necessarily have to make new theoretical contribu-

tions to achieve significant research results.

In this sense there ..i§. something new about

development economics.
IV. Concluding Comments
Vile return to the question posed at the beginning: is there here a potential subject,
which may in time occupy an established position alongside older branches of economics?
An affirmative answer seems warranted, but with qualifications.
1.

There is not as yet any substantial body of knowledge about the less developed

economies.

There is not a single LDC whose economy is now understood in the way that

the British or American economies are understood.

This is due partly to data deficiencies

but mainly to lack of careful investigation.
2.

Development economics should not be construed simply as an exercise in

economic engineering. directed at current policy problems.

The core of the subject is, or

should be, an effort to understand the operation of the less developed economies.

Such an

understanding, acquired through decades of careful effort, has been necessary for policy
formation in the MDC's.

It seems very likely that comparable effort will be required in

the LDC's.
3.

If this view is accepted, the "economic development" label should be replaced

by a broader and more neutral title.
restrictive.

11

"Early economic growth" would be better, but still too

Structure and growth of less developed economies,

the less developed countries," would be in the right direction.

11

or simple "economics of
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4.
wide.

The range of possible investiga tion in the less developed economie s is hopelessl y

No one can prudently set up as an expert on all aspects of all LDC's..

Specializ a-

tion is required, either on a territoria l basis or, as may seem more profitable to most
economis ts, on a functiona l basis.

It was hence suggested that those wishing to work in

the LDC's might well start from a solid foundatio n in one or more functiona l specialti es.
S.

Investiga tion of the LDC' s is not merely a matter of applying familiar analytica l

tools to new data.

New theorizing is required both in attacking specializ ed research

problems and in construct ing general models of early economic growth.

This will gradually

build the solid intellectu al core which is still largely lacking.
A considera ble number of economis ts are already working along these lines, and
their number seems certain to increase in the years ahead.

A generatio n from now it should

be possible to give a less qualified "Yes" answer to the topic of this paper.

I
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